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Introduction
The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations (ALI
Project) has triggered a sharp debate on corporate directors' duty
of care.' The history of the ALI Project and the events that led to
Copyright © 1985 by Tamar Frankel.
* Professor of Law, Boston University; LL.M. 1964, S.J.D. 1972, Harvard University. I am indebted to Jerry Goldsholle, Esq. for his helpful comments.
1. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRucTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 3,1984) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES or Ten-

tative Draft No. 3]. Section 4.01, Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; the Business
Judgment Rule provides:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform his functions in good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation and otherwise consistent with the principles of § 2.01, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar
circumstances.
(b) The duty of care standard set forth in Subsection (a) includes the obligation of a director or officer to make reasonable inquiry in appropriate
circumstances.
(c) (1) In performing his duty and functions, a director or officer is entitled
to rely on other directors or officers, employees, experts, other persons or
committees of the board in accordance with the standards set forth in
§§ 4.02-.03. (2) The board may delegate to directors, officers, employees,
experts, other persons, or committees of the board the function of identifying matters requiring the attention of the board, and a director, when acting in accordance with the standards set forth in §§ 4.02-.03, is entitled to
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its establishment have received different interpretations. 2 All
agree, however, that the Project was prompted by a movement to
internalize control over the managements of large American corporations through independent, trustworthy boards of directors to
which courts will defer; a movement towards increased corporate
self-governance. 3 The debate over the ALl Project's statement of
rely on the decisions, judgments, or performance of such persons or
committees.
(d) A director or officer does not violate his duty under this Section with
respect to the consequences of a business judgment if he:
(1) was informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to
the extent he reasonably believed to be appropriate under the
circumstances;
(2) was not interested in the subject of the business judgment and made
the judgment in good faith; and
(3) had a rational basis for believing that the business judgment was in the
best interests of the corporation.
(e) A director or officer who is subect to liability because of the breach of a
duty under this Section will be held liable for damage suffered by his corporation only if the breach of a duty was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the corporation.
(Footnotes omitted). Except for a few definitions that relate solely to Part V, the
definitions cited in Tentative Draft No. 3 are set forth in Part I of Tentative Draft
No. 2. Principlesis a project of the American Law Institute, hereinafter referred to as
the ALL.
The problem that the duty of care addresses arises not only in the context of corporate managers and directors; it arises generally when persons agree to serve others
("entrustors"), such as clients of investment advisors, trust beneficiaries, and principals with respect to agents. These entrustors may be unable to monitor the quality of
the services for which they bargained, except at very high costs. Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 808-16 (1983). If service givers are self-interested, they
may act in a manner that maximizes their own interests, and, although they may have
agreed to "give their best," they might serve with less care or with less prudence
ultimately defeating the legitimate expectations of the entrustors. Moreover, when
legally protected societal interests conflict with those of the executives' and investors'
(for example, reducing short-term profits), executives tend to take legal risks to reduce corporate profits in the future rather than expend the costs of avoiding these
risks.
2. See Brudney, The Role of the Board ofDirectors: The AL! and Its Critics,37 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 223 (1983) (suggesting that the ALI proposals are largely a description
of existing common law doctrine and merely make existing restrictions more explicit); Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 187 (1983) (analyzing the history of the ALI Project and concluding
that the reexamination and modernization of statutory corporate law is long overdue);
Goldstein, FutureArticulation of CorporateLaw, 39 Bus. LAw. 1541 (1984) (addressing the competing ideologies that advocate either more or less control of corporate
governance and the various attempts to impose control during recent history including the ALI Project); Kennedy, The Standard of Responsibilityfor Directors: Comments on Proposed Section 4.01 of the ALI Statement on Corporate Governance, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 636-637 (1985) (pointing out the inflexibility of section 4.01 insofar
as the articulated duty of care conflicts with the powers of the board and departs from
settled case precedent); Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance:A Critique of
PartIV, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 655 (1985) (criticizing Part IV of Principleswhich is
concerned with the duty of care and the business judgment rule; although the draft is
supposed to be both descriptive and prescriptive, it fails on both counts); Harold M.
Williams, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the National Conference on Corporate Governance and Accountability in the 1980s (March
27-29 1980) (Williams was a prominent spokesman for the movement).
3. One model for this movement is the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-1-65 and its "deregulation" by the Securities and Exchange Commission
through the transfer of powers to, and attendant duties to, the disinterested directors
of these companies. See 2 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS,
Chapter VIII C (1980).
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the duty of care is important because the results of the debate may
provide the acid test of the corporate governance movement and
approach.
In a recent article, Bayless Manning performed a commendable
and important task in describing the role of the directors of large
American corporations. 4 Manning concluded with a proposal that
would permit each director to set for himself the standard of care
that he would follow, provided that the director sets the standard
for himself in "good faith."5 Another commentator has suggested
eliminating the duty altogether.6 On the other end of the spectrum, critics have suggested that the rule is too lax, and that a
stricter standard should apply.7
The Project's statement of the directors' duty of care provides a
middle ground between these positions. Under the ALI's formulation, courts determine the standard of the duty of care. Yet, judicial standards are influenced by the practices that the majority of
corporate boards follow, rather than by the practices of the minorities at the extremes. The leadership of corporate executives,
therefore, plays an important role in judicial decisions establishing
the standard of care for corporate directors and executives.
This Article discusses a selected list of criticisms, which the proposed ALI duty of care provoked, and explores the results to
which they might lead. The Article concludes that the current
formulation of the duty of care is useful, when applied judiciously,
and that this formulation should not be changed.
A.

Criticism: The Duty of Care is Too Vague

One criticism of the duty of care is that the duty is too vague.
"There is no common understanding of what directors are supposed to do. Only that they are supposed to do it with care."" Indeed, both current law and the ALI Project provide only general
guidelines for directors on what degree of care they should exercise in managing their corporations.
To evaluate the criticism of vagueness, one must examine why
vague rules are undesirable. Once the reasons for the inadequacy
4. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director'sDuty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Manning, The Business Judgment Rule].
5. Id. at 1499.
6. Scott, CorporationLaw and the American Law Institute CorporateGovernance Project 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 937 (1983).
7. See Brudney, supra note 2, at 230-31; Note, The Propriety of JudicialDeference to CorporateBoards of Directors,96 HARV. L. REV. 1894, 1912-13 (1983).
8. Manning, Touring the Horizon with the Business Judgment Rule, at 13 (Draft
Oct. 10, 1983 on file available at the George Washington Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Manning, Touring the Horizon].
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are found, one can judge whether and to what extent these reasons apply to corporate directors.
Vague rules are presumed to be ineffective, unfair, and highly
risky to persons to whom the rules apply. Experience shows that
vague rules are ineffective. If a rule applicable to A is not communicated to him, he will not know what is expected of him and
might not obey, defeating the purpose of the rule. Furthermore,
vague rules are unfair. A is treated unfairly if he is punished,
eventhough he could not ascertain what his duties are and was not
given a chance to perform them. Vague rules also pose high risk
for persons to whom the rules apply, but provide no safe harbor of
specificity on which these persons could rely. Naturally, these
rules are most risky when enforced by the courts, after the fact. 9
Consequently, if I understand the criticism of vagueness correctly,
the general guidelines of the duty of care are ineffective, unfair to
directors, and expose them to high legal risks.
An examination of the reasons underlying the objection to
vague rules, however, leads to the conclusion that vague rules are
appropriate for corporate directors. Directors are vested with
very broad powers and discretion precisely because their activities
cannot be specified in advance. As Professor Manning described
so aptly, the varieties of business strategies and environments
under which directors operate are staggering.1 0 Specific rules
would tie the directors' hands and reduce their usefulness. To
specify fully the actions that directors have to take in any conceivable situation would not only result in tremendous costs, but
would also require superhuman foresight. Past experience shows
that giving specific directives to corporate management is often
counterproductive. The approach of "tell me exactly what to do
and I will do it" did not result in a desirable or healthy business
environment when taken in the areas of environmental law, employees' health hazards, or product safety. Specificity in these
cases produced too many detailed rules that made business operation expensive, difficult, and inflexible.
The answer that specificity is unattainable, however, addresses
the feasibility of a general rule, but not the argument that a general rule is ineffective, unfair, and highly risky to directors.
I submit that a broad guideline in which the duty of care is
framed is appropriate for experienced fiduciaries vested with
broad discretion in the exercise of their function. The typical director of a large corporation is a chief executive officer of another
large business, educational, or governmental institution."1 He is
9.
L.J. 65
10.
11.

See generally Diver, The OptimalPrecisionof AdministrativeRules, 93 YALE
(1983).
Manning, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 4, at 1481.
Id. at 1482. See generally Allen, Continuity and Change Within the Core Cor-

porateElite, 19 Soc. Q. 510 (1978) (examining the composition of core corporate elite
and its evolution from 1935 to 1970); Koenig & Gogel, InterlockingCorporateDirectorships as a Social Network, 40 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 37 (1981) (examining the effect of
similar social networks between corporate officers and directors and the effect of
VOL.
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experienced in monitoring those who carry out the institutional
mission. Better than anyone else, he knows what effective management involves and what tools should be used to ensure accountability of those under his supervision. As Professor Manning
pointed out, directors need not be experts in the particular business of the enterprise; general familiarity with the business is sufficient. 2 Yet, surely directors understand the best and most
effective way in which to monitor other corporate executives and
ensure that corporate policies are put in place and implemented.
Similarly, directors are quite able to determine the necessary
amount of time and attention to devote to current and anticipated
issues. Because the standard of care is within directors' expertise,
a broad guideline is not unfair as to them. In this respect, directors are similar to other expert fiduciaries, such as attorneys, to
whom broad rules prescribing care have been traditionally
applied.
As to the risk to which directors are exposed by virtue of the
duty of care, there are a number of answers. Such a risk leaves
unbound gray areas which may induce directors to err on the
bright, rather than on the dark side. More significantly, the risk is
bound to produce heightened awareness by the boards. Consequently, directors can, and indeed have, initiated preventive programs in sensitive areas of corporate operations such as the
environment.' 3 This trend strengthens, and is compatible with,
corporate self-governance, reducing the need for judicial and governmental regulation of corporate business.
The directors' risk is reduced by institutional and legal limitations on shareholders' derivative suits, by the business judgment
rule, and by indemnification and insurance. Directors' risk is also
these networks on corporate control); Useem, The Social Organizationof the American Business Elite and Participationof CorporationDirectors in the Governance of
American Institutions,44 AM. SOC. REV. 553 (1979) (supporting the thesis that American business elite are differentiated along an inner group axis, at least with respect to
the selection of business people to assist in governance of other institutions); Whitt, Is
Oil Different?A Comparisonof the Social Backgrounds and OrganizationalAffiliations of Oil and Non-oil Directors,29 Soc. PROBs. 142 (1981) (examining the backgrounds between oil industry directors and nonoil industry directors finding no
significant variation). Boards may include a few directors who bring to the board special expertise or sensitivity on certain matters, such as minorities and women. These
directors may be subject to the duty of care of a different mix: higher in their special
areas and lower in respect to other general matters. Yet, the duty-of-care formulation
is sufficiently broad and flexible to permit courts to make distinctions and fashion
reasonable and fair application of the rule.
12. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 4, at 1482.

13. A.

FREEDMAN, INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO HEALTH RISK, A RESEARCH REPORT

FROM THE CONFERENCE BOARD 3 (1981). Powerful voices within the corporate community advocate a preventive approach including self-imposed internal controls.
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reduced by the influence that14 board practices have on the judicial
standard of the duty of care.
Finally, even though the standard of care is general, subject
matter specificity is not the only way to provide directors with a
safe harbor; specific process is another. The duty of care, as administered by the courts and restated in the ALI Project,
prescribes for the boards a decision-making process of informed
deliberation. Rarely do the courts review on the merits directors'
decisions that do not involve conflicts of interest. The ALI Project
requires that the director be "informed with respect to the subject
of the business judgment to the extent that he reasonably believed
to be appropriate under the circumstances."'1 5 This process is criticized, it seems, as too specific. The criticism is puzzling in light of
objections to the substantive part of the rule as too general. If the
concern of the critics is that directors are exposed to legal risk,
why not support process as a method of reducing the risk? I
therefore submit that the generality of the standard of the duty of
care is necessary and appropriate.
B. Criticism of the Process
As stated above, the specificity of the required process under the
duty of care has also raised criticism. 16 Any reasoned, deliberate
decision can be subject to second guessing by hindsight. Yet, this
problem is exacerbated when there is no showing of informed deliberation; courts have continually stated that board decisions
must be evaluated in light of the circumstances
at the time of the
7
decision, not in light of later events.1
The criticism of the required process is based, among other
things, on the "reality of corporate boards." Critics emphasize
that directors function under severe time constraints. Outside directors commit only a fraction of their time to the business of the
corporations on whose boards they serve.' 8 Therefore, they may
not be able to study innumerable documents, nor be informed
about the many business details of huge enterprises.' 9 Furthermore, even though the boards have the legal authority to deter14. The ALI Project formulates the standard of care as that which "an ordinary
prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under
similarcircumstances" (emphasis added). Consequently the standard is influenced
by acceptable practices of boards of comparable corporations.
15. Tentative Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 4.01(d)(1).
16. Manning, Touring the Horizon, supra note 8,at 20.
17. See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ("[I]n order to
determine whether transactions approved by a director subject him to liability for
negligence, we must look to the facts as they exist at the time of their occurrence not
aided or enlightened by those which subsequently took place.").
18. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 4, at 1481.
19. Directors use not only internal reports but also external reports including
those of regulatory agencies, as directors should. Occasionally they are required by
law to read agency reports. New York insurance law has, until recently, required that
the reports of the staff of the Superintendent of Insurance be read aloud at the board
meetings. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 31 (McKinney 1966). This extreme position has been
deleted and directors may now read the reports, instead of being read to, outside the
board meetings. N.Y. Ins. Law § 31 (McKinney 1984). Any responsible director would
agree that the board members should indeed read these reports.
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mine their own agendas and specify which issues should be
brought before them periodically and which issues should be
brought before them as events occur, it is stated that in fact boards
20
do not exercise this authority.
Implicit in these statements are two unexpressed conclusions.
The first is that the duty of care remain flexible, and that the
courts should take into account the "reality of the boards." The
second unexpressed conclusion is that it is impossible for outside
directors to effectively monitor executives and to maintain the
risks of the corporate business at an acceptable level.
The answer to the first conclusion is that courts do take into
consideration that directors function only part-time; courts do adjust the standard of care accordingly. 21 If the second conclusion
lurks behind the first, .then the answer is that no self-respecting
and responsible director would go below a minimal standard of
care, neither would he expect his colleagues or the courts to set a
standard below the minimum, nor could he condone a "figure22
head" directorship.
20. Professor Manning argued that directors, with a few important exceptions, do
not establish the board's agenda. See Manning, The Business Judgment Rule, supra
note 4, at 1484-85. The statement, however, may be too broad. First, the identity of
those who determine agendas may depend on the power structure within each corporation. An outside director, who holds large shareholding or corporate debt, may
wield sufficient clout to introduce into the agenda items of interest to him. Second,
because of corporate law prohibitions, the agendas include matters involving executives' conflicts of interest and executive compensation. Third, specific laws require
that directors decide certain matters. See, e.g., Investment Company Act, §§ 15(a), (c),
17(j), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a), (c), 17(j) (1982). Bank directors, too, are required to decide
certain operational aspects of the bank. Therefore, if the power structure within the
corporation does not result in a sufficiently substantive and informative agenda, the
law can and does correct the deficiency. The issue is not whether boards currently use
legal power to establish their agendas to give meaningful controls, but whether they
should. In The Business Judgment Rule, Manning would limit the extent of the
board's legally required exercise of power to establish its agenda to only two areas
which directors cannot ignore. The rationale that corporate power structure does not
permit directors to establish their agendas conflicts with these exceptions. If the "reality" of the board precludes members from raising questions within the exceptions
The Business Judgment Rule carves out (e.g., matters dealing with an internal information system), then the Manning rationale would lead to relieving directors of liability even as to the excepted matter.
21. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78,188 A.2d 125 (Sup.
Ct. 1963). "By reason of the extent and complexity of the company's operations, it is
not practicable for the Board to consider in detail specific problems of the various
divisions." Id. at 82, 188 A.2d at 128. '"he duties of the Allis Chalmers directors were
fixed by the nature of the enterprise.... The very magnitude of the enterpise required them to confine their control to the broad policy decisions." Id.at 85, 188 A.2d
at 130.
22. The "figurehead" director is gone from the board scene of large American
corporations today. The public has come to rely on board members who attend to the
business of the corporation on a level acceptable in the business community. The
consequences of this development are discussed infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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The issue of time constraint is not unique to directors. It appears in the context of professional fiduciaries. Individual attorneys, particularly successful ones, make commitments to many
clients, to civic causes, to public service. There comes a point,
however, at which they must decline additional commitments in
order to honor existing ones.
Specific process is necessary to enable the courts to review the
boards' decisions. If the merits of the decisions are left to the directors' business judgment, free of judicial review, then the process by which these decisions are reached would ensure that the
directors do exercise their business judgment. This is, in fact,
what the duty of informed deliberation means.
Being experienced executives, directors know that monitoring
techniques include requirements for at least some written explanations, especially when other measures for testing the quality of
service, such as results, are not available. Directors' performance
cannot be judged by short-term corporate profits, because the financial condition of the corporation may depend on circumstances
beyond their control. Directors' performance can be evaluated
mainly by their decision-making process.
Specific process is therefore necessary because it makes directors accountable. It provides them with at least a partial safe harbor and enables them to create a paper record in support of their
business judgment. Furthermore, the majority of directors themselves would not subscribe to an empty standard in performing
their duties. I conclude that the argument that the required process under the duty of care is onerous and unrealistic is not
persuasive.
C. Criticism: The Duty of Care Is Costly
Critics of the substantive and procedural aspects of the duty of
care argue that the duty is costly. Clearly, the more time and attention required of persons whose time and attention are valuable,
the higher their remuneration should become. In addition, the requirement of process may lead to a greater involvement of counsel
and other expert advisers and attendant fees and, finally, to more
paperwork. The duty of care may also result in litigation and attendant costs. Litigation cost is a special problem involving
broader issues than the duty of care. More importantly, costs
should be evaluated in light of the benefits that these costs are
likely to produce. Among these benefits are mainly the following
four. First, the directors may hold the executives' feet to the fire,
so to speak. A subtle pressure, but nonetheless pressure, exists
when the board is attentive and informed. Second, the costs involved in outside directors' compensation are miniscule as compared to the value of their services. 23 Third, attentive boards
23. Assuming that directors receive approximately $24,000 a year for spending 120
hours at board meetings, the corporation receives top talent for $200 an hour, a price
available nowhere. Even if the executives sitting on the boards receive approximately
$125,000 from the organizations which they manage for 2500 hours of work, the rate of
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make substantial contributions as a testing ground for corporate
strategies. They can thus assist in making the corporation a wellrun institution. Fourth, an attentive board reduces the probability
of sudden, unanticipated mishaps or difficulties. I submit that
these benefits outweigh the costs.
D.

Criticism: The Effect of the Duty of Care is to Chill
EntrepreneurialZeal

Critics charge that the duty of care may deter directors and their
corporations from taking business risks, thereby chilling innovative and creative activities, which the law ought to encourage. 24 I
agree with the public policy of encouraging innovative business activities. In fact, doing nothing is sometimes a riskier policy than
trying something new. The duty of care, however, helps ensure
that directors are attentive to prevent the kind of risk that does
not benefit the corporation.
In some cases the incentive system and balance of risk between
the executives and the shareholders may result in executives' tendency to take too much, not too little, risk in operating the company. Laws that prohibit corporations from free-riding at the
expense of society, such as polluting the environment, pose future
financial risks to the corporation that executives, pressed for immediate profits, may overlook to avoid immediate costs. Therefore, the rule may dampen the kind of risks that executives should
not take.
Moreover, the duty of care is aimed at ensuring that corporate
directors will be aware of what the risks are. The law requires
that they set a rational level of the risk, not insure against it. By
and large, that level is left to the business judgment of the directors. No responsible director would simply ignore warning signs.
Legal liability attaches only to behavior that is unacceptable to
such a responsible director.
The duty of care is aimed at risks that are unacceptable in the
business community. A bank board that approves additional loans
to a failing customer, in the hope that the customer's financial
condition will improve, when all other creditor banks are demanding the repayment of their loans, might be violating its duty of
care. Here the risk is taken against great odds, in disregard of the
judgment of other informed lenders. The risk does not involve
creativity or innovation; it is as old as banking itself. If these bank
compensation per hour for these executives is not less than $1000 an hour. If we add
fringe benefits for these executives, their compensation level might double. Thus, the
corporation on whose board these directors serve receives, in exchange for $200, quality service for which the market pays five to ten times as much.
24. Scott, supra note 6, at 946.
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directors approve, without informed deliberation, the executives'
decision to continue lending, the directors might be violating their
duty of care. Directors' faith in the corporate executive does not
mean blind faith.
Similarly, when the corporation takes risks by marketing a new
product, which is later found to endanger consumers' safety and
results in a large unanticipated court judgment against the corporation, the board might not be responsible for the corporation's
losses. However, if after the judgment is paid, the board fails to
inquire into the reasons for the mishap and into ways to prevent
its future occurrence, the board might have breached its duty of
care.
Finally, there is no evidence that corporations producing innovative products have terminated the business to protect their directors from liabilities. 25 There is evidence that they tend to
establish preventive measures to avoid losses and continue to
monitor sensitive areas as they get notice of them. Thus, rather
than chilling innovation, the effect of the duty of care is to chill
unacceptable behavior.
E.

Criticism: The Duty of Care is InappropriateBecause the
Courts are Unsuitable to Oversee CorporateBoards

The legal duty of care, it is argued, is inappropriate because courts
are inappropriate supervisors of large institutions. Courts are institutionally designed to deal in discrete conflicts among few indi26
viduals, not in conflicts affecting intra-institutional relations.
This argument is not easily dismissed. Judicial interference in internal corporate activities is indeed problematic. Courts have developed corporate law by analogies to relations among individuals.
The rules may be too inflexible or too general to suit all corporations. Yet, for this very reason courts are generally averse to such
interference. When corporate, governance and structure were
changed by judicial decrees, these decrees were usually based on
27
consent orders.
Furthermore, the tension between the need for flexibility in the
structure of large corporations and legal rules, which introduce
inflexibility or too much generality, is not unique to corporate law.
This tension exists when courts review decisions involving labor
management relations or decisions of administrative agencies. In
all these cases, the decision makers are subject to judicial review,
constraints, and accountability. In all these cases, the courts are
25. These companies may, however, wisely tend to diversify the business because
of business, not legal, risks.
26. Frankel, supra note 1, at 804-08.
27. Note, The SEC and Court-AppointedDirectors:Time to Tailor the Directorsto
Fit the Sui, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 507 (1982) (tracing the development of court-appointed
directors in SEC injunctive actions and concluding that the SEC should modify its use
of consent-decree director appointments as a means for reform. The SEC should instead return the remedy to its legal foundations: redressing of wrongdoing).
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sensitive to the effects of their ad hoc judgments on institutional,
internal affairs.
Critics argue that courts are unsuitable to oversee corporate
boards because courts lack business expertise. The argument flies
in the face of judicial reality. For decades, judges have used
macroeconomic analysis in the antitrust area and have made business decisions in the bankruptcy, probate, and trust fields. It is
true that these areas of the law are distinguished from corporate
law. They do not involve the courts in entrepreneurial businesses
to the same extent carried out by corporations. But this distinction is relevant to the adverse impact of judicial interference in a
changing business environment. It does not bear on the evaluation of judicial business expertise. Besides, if courts lack business
expertise, they are also incapable of reviewing boards' decisions
that involve conflicts of interest. And yet, who would suggest
such a conclusion? Finally, courts can be educated by expert testimony, including that of directors and executives. That courts defer to disinterested directors' decisions does not prove that courts
lack the expertise to decide business issues. It proves only that
courts choose when it is appropriate to defer to trustworthy corporate internal control groups such as the boards.
In sum, limitations of judicial review over institutions are not
unique to corporate law. The limitations are inherent in the judicial process and the nature of the institution which the courts supervise. The problem is ameliorated by judicial sensitivity to it.
F.

Criticism: The Duty of Care is Dead

Few court decisions are based on the duty of care. Consequently,
one critic concluded that the duty should be eliminated. 28 Even if
this evaluation of the duty were correct, the vitality and use of the
duty is irrelevant to the issue of whether the duty should remain
on the books. If the duty is a dead letter, one might ask what is all
the excitement about? There are many dormant rules on the
books; yet, these rules do not raise the kind of furor that the duty
of care has raised recently. If the duty of care is preached but not
practiced, then the directors' legal risk is low; why not leave the
rule on the books? On the other hand, it has been argued that it is
wrong to leave the duty of care dormant; that it should be revital29
ized and enforced strictly.
28. Scott, supra note 6, at 935-36.
29. See, e.g., Note, The Propriety of Judicial Deference to CorporateBoards of
Directors,96 HARV. L. REV. 1894 (1983) (suggesting, as a solution for the alleged dormant status of the duty of care, that the rule be strictly enforced).
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One critic noted the revival of the duty in recent cases against
failed bank directors 30 and drew from this revival the conclusion
that the substance and procedure of the duty should be changed.
All these conclusions are in the eyes of the beholders.
The assumption that the duty of care is dead is not borne out by
its history. In fact, a long-term view of the duty of care seems to
show that it is dormant. Courts do not base their decisions on the
duty of care as often as they do on the duty of loyalty, but invoke
the duty of care in special cases when directors have no conflicts of
interest. In any event, the arguments regarding the status of the
duty have little bearing on the main issue. The fact that the duty
is invoked in unique circumstances and not regularly is irrelevant
to determine whether the imposition of the duty is justified, and if
it is, what standards it should impose.
G. Two Proposalsto Which the Criticism of the Duty of Care
Leads
Two specific proposals are made by critics of the ALI Project with
respect to the duty of care. The first is to eliminate the duty altogether.3 1 The second is to make it self-defining, that is, to follow
the standard that each director sets for himself in good faith. 32 Directors should determine what their function should be, how
much time they should commit to corporate business, how much
information they should obtain, and to what extent they should
supervise corporate executives.
These proposals, however, may not necessarily free directors
from legal responsibility. The proposals may lead to more, not
less litigation.
Currently, disinterested directors have the primary authority
over the situations in which executives act with conflicts of interest. In these cases, disinterested outside directors play a decisive
role in "representing" the corporation, because the courts defer to
a great extent to these directors' decisions. Far from being unimportant, the duty of care is crucial to the current status of judicial
intervention in corporate internal affairs. If outside directors are
free of the duty of care in the manner in which they function, then
the courts should not defer to their approval of executives' selfdealing transactions or executives' compensation. I believe that
the results of erasing the duty of care would be to increase the
extent of judicial review over executives' self-dealings and compensation. The proposed self-limiting duty may also prove to be
far more onerous to directors than the ALI's formulation of the
duty. If the burden of proving good faith is placed on them, directors may be required to document it in advance, when the decision
30. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (court found high potential
for liability pointing out that, under the facts, the duty of care may have been violated), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). See generally Deal, Liability of Bank Directors, 39 Bus. LAw. 1033 (1984).
31. Scott, supra note 6, at 935-36.
32. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 4, at 1499.
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is made - a costly and perhaps impossible task. The issue of the
burden of proof may embroil the directors in litigation for years.
Since those who advocate the elimination of the duty of care prefer less, not more, judicial interference, both proposals may well
lead to precisely the opposite of what they wish to achieve.
The proposals might not be followed by the courts. If the law
eliminates the duty of care altogether, or if the duty becomes selfdefined and self-enforcing, that law may well become a dead letter. Some courts may, in a particular case, place their trust in a
particular board and defer to its decision. But it is naive to think
that, if the courts suspect harm to society or to the enterprise, they
will refrain from introducing their own standards and processes
for the boards to follow. This is particularly true with respect to
the proposal to leave the standard of the duty of care to each director acting in good faith. History teaches us that this society does
not tolerate power without responsibility. Directors know this
principle better than anyone else. That is why they are successful
executives within their own organizations.
The ALI's proposal limits the directors' money liability to
$100,000. 33 It has been argued that the courts might tend to circumvent this limit.34 This result is possible, but improbable, in
light of judicial deference to specific numerical limitations established by law. Clear drafting will minimize the directors' risk of
higher liability. On the other hand, when it comes to powers and
duties of fiduciaries, courts have traditionally asserted their authority (in spite of contractual directives) to fashion both powers
and duties for fiduciaries and have maintained as a public policy

the basic model. Those who manage and control other peoples'
money must be judicially accountable. 35 It is, therefore, unlikely

that the courts
will relinquish their authority over directors' fidu36
ciary duties.

33. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.06 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982).
34. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 4, at 1498.
35. Frankel, supra note 1, at 821-24.
36. To eliminate the duty of care, without more, would create a dangerous precedent. Even though currently no one suggests that the duty of loyalty be eliminated, a
theoretical basis may be developed to eliminate that duty as well. A recent study, for
example, purports to show that the compensation of directors of banks subject to
take-over threats is lower than the compensation of directors of banks not subject to
such a threat, by virtue of protective state legislation. See James, An Analysis of the
Effect of State Acquisition Laws on ManagerialEfficiency: the Case of the Bank Holding Company Acquisitions, 27 J. L. & ECON. 211, 214, 222-26 (1984). The logical conclusion from such a study is that compensation of bank executives, and presumably
those of other corporations as well, ought to be left to market competition and that
the markets rather than the courts would set these compensations at the right level.
Assuming, as I do, that markets are not entirely efficient, and that judicial review of
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The critics' proposals provide a basis for the argument that the
movement for corporate self-governance has failed. The arguments that directors are unable to undertake serious involvement
in the corporation on whose boards they serve, and are consequently unwilling to be legally responsible for their decisions, are
an invitation to counter-proposals that directors' powers should
decrease, deference to their decisions should cease, and that they
should function as advisory boards. A further inquiry will then
have to be made as to what should substitute for the boards.
I am not certain that the proposals to relieve boards of directors
of large American corporations from legal responsibility for care
represent the wishes of the outside directors of these corporations.
Excess in one direction leads to excess in the opposite direction.
Power without responsibility will inevitably lead to a backlash resulting in stricter liabilities far more burdensome than the current
duty of care proposed by the ALI. I have serious doubts whether
extreme positions, such as the elimination of directors' duty to act
with care, are serving directors and their corporations well.
Weighing the possible alternatives, outside directors may find that
they prefer the middle road taken by the ALI Project after all.

corporate executives is necessary, the elimination of the duty of care is the first step
to the elimination of judicial review of corporate management decisions in general.
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